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MANDATING WOMEN: DEFENDING SB 826
AND FEMALE QUOTAS IN THE
CORPORATE WORKPLACE
Lauren Kim*
I. INTRODUCTION
Gender discrimination is not a new, or unknown, issue. “Glass
ceiling,” “glass elevator,” “78 cents gap,” and “persist” are all
common colloquialisms expressing the discrimination and barriers
women have faced, especially in corporate settings.1 Recently,
however, some of these colloquialisms, like “glass ceiling,” have been
considered “outdated” as major concerns about gender discrimination
have been reduced as the wage gap gradually closes.2 Yet, gender
discrimination is still extremely prevalent in professional
environments, and eliminating gender discrimination today requires
more directed action and initiatives than those already set forth.
California attempted to tackle this issue by instituting a law in an
area that women have continually been blocked from—the corporate
workplace.3 In 2018, California passed California Senate Bill 826
(“SB 826”), which requires publicly held domestic and foreign
corporations whose principal executive offices are in California to
have at least one female director on their boards by the close of the
* J.D. Candidate, May 2020, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Economics and B.A.,
Political Science, University of Southern California, 2010. Special thanks to Professor Kimberly
West-Faulcon for her helpful suggestions and guidance throughout the writing process, the
members of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for all their hard work through the entire
production cycle, and my parents and friends for their endless love and support in all of my
endeavors.
1. Jessica Bennett, Who Still Calls It a ‘Glass Ceiling?’ Not the 6 Women Running for
President, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/23/us/politics/glassceiling-female-candidates-2020.html?module=inline (these terms “describe the inability of whitecollar women to rise beyond the mid-manager level in their jobs, and the often invisible barriers
preventing that rise”).
2. Id. (“The women running for president [in the 2020 election] are promising many things
as they make their pitches to voters. They are being asked repeatedly how being women may affect
their chances. But so far, none of them are emphasizing the ‘glass ceiling.’”).
3. S.B. 826, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
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2019 calendar year.4 Additionally, by the close of the 2021 calendar
year, the corporations must have at least two female directors if there
are five or more board directors and at least three female directors if
there are six or more board directors.5 If a corporation fails to comply
with these terms, it will be fined $100,000 for the first violation and
$300,000 for each subsequent yearly violation.6 Although similar rules
have been adopted in other countries like France and Norway,
California is the first state in the United States to pass a bill instituting
a mandatory corporate quota.7
SB 826 is justified because the effects of gender discrimination
are most pronounced in corporate boards and management positions.
Latest statistics show women are more likely than men to hold fouryear degrees, but women mainly work in middle-skill occupations that
only require some training or education beyond high school.8 These
middle-skill occupations typically have lower average earnings than
occupations with a predominantly male workforce such as IT,
transportation, and manufacturing.9 Women make up only 5% of the
Fortune 500 CEOs, 7% of the top executives in the Fortune 500, 10%
of the top management positions in the S&P 1500, and 19% of the
S&P 1500 board seats.10
Unfortunately, the California legislature has already faced
incredible backlash and opposition for SB 826, as California-based
companies claim the requirement is unconstitutional and violates the

4. Id. (adding sections 301.3 and 2115.5 to the California Corporations Code).
5. Id. (defining female as an individual who self-identifies her gender as a woman).
6. Id.
7. See William Sprouse, California to Require Women on Boards, CFO (Oct. 1, 2018),
https://www.cfo.com/governance/2018/10/california-to-require-women-on-boards/ (“In 2017,
Pennsylvania passed a resolution urging public and private companies to have a minimum of 30%
women on their boards by 2020, but that law does not impose penalties.”); see also Jill E. Fisch &
Steven Davidoff Solomon, California’s “Women on Boards” Statute and the Scope of Regulatory
Competition, EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. (forthcoming) (on file with the Faculty Scholarship at Penn
Law) (describing “the proliferation of jurisdictions that have adopted legislation imposing gender
quotas on corporate boards”).
8. NAT’L COAL. FOR WOMEN & GIRLS IN EDUC., TITLE IX AT 45: CAREER & TECHNICAL
EDUCATION: A PATH TO ECONOMIC GROWTH 4 (2017), https://www.ncwge.org/TitleIX45/
Career%20and%20Technical%20Education.pdf.
9. Id. (“Women are concentrated in fields such as child care, preschool education, home care,
and hairdressing—all occupations with median earnings for full-time work that would leave a
family of three in near-poverty.”).
10. JUDITH WARNER ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE WOMEN’S LEADERSHIP GAP:
WOMEN’S LEADERSHIP BY THE NUMBERS 5 (2018), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/content/
uploads/2018/11/19121654/WomensLeadershipFactSheet.pdf.
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Equal Protection Clause.11 The Equal Protection Clause states that no
state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.”12 A corporate quota mandating women raises
the issue of whether, in the efforts to foster equality for women,
inequality is created elsewhere. Two parties have already filed suits
against the state of California claiming that SB 826 deprives men of
equal protection and relies on a variety of stereotypes about women.13
Both parties claim that California’s quota and initiative classify on the
basis of gender, which triggers a heighted scrutiny.14 Intermediate
scrutiny is applied to gender classifications, as such classifications
must be substantially related to an important government interest.15
How the courts apply intermediate scrutiny has not always been
straightforward.16 In United States v. Virginia,17 a case regarding a
male-only military college in Virginia, the Supreme Court utilized an
intermediate standard of review in analyzing whether this admission
policy violated the Equal Protection Clause.18 Virginia, however, led
to confusion because the Court applied intermediate scrutiny in a
rigorous way, closer to strict scrutiny.19 Lower courts were left to
apply this unclear test of intermediate scrutiny in various gender
discrimination claims.20 Most recently in Nguyen v. Immigration &

11. See Complaint at 5–6, Meland v. Padilla, No. 2:19-cv-02288-JAM-AC (E.D. Cal. Nov. 13,
2019), 2019 WL 6037825; Amended Complaint at 4–5, Crest v. Padilla, No. 19STCV27561 (Super.
Ct. Cal. Sep. 20, 2019).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
13. See Complaint, Meland v. Padilla, supra note 11, at 6–7; Amended Complaint, Crest v.
Padilla, supra note 11, at 4–5.
14. Complaint, Meland v. Padilla, supra note 11, at 6–7; Amended Complaint, Crest v. Padilla,
supra note 11, at 4–5.
15. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–33 (1996); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 218
(1976) (holding that an intermediate-level of scrutiny is applied to gender classifications).
16. Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect Classifications, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 135, 138
(2011) (“Since the outcome of an equal protection case is largely determined by whether the group
is designated as a suspect, quasi-suspect, or non-suspect class, one may assume that the test for
distinguishing between the three types of classes has been carefully crafted and precisely defined.
But despite decades of case law on this specific issue, nothing could be further from the truth.”).
17. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
18. Id. at 515–16.
19. See R. Randall Kelso, Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Clause and
Related Constitutional Doctrines Protecting Individual Rights: The “Base Plus Six” Model and
Modern Supreme Court Practice, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 225, 238 (2002) (“[T]he opinion ultimately
seemed to require that the State of Virginia show an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for its
gender discrimination at the Virginia Military Institute (VMI), not merely a substantial relationship
to important government interests.”).
20. Id.
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Naturalization Service,21 the Court returned to the “substantially”
related version of intermediate scrutiny.22 These two cases left the
lower courts with two different understandings of the government
engaging in stereotyping.
Applying intermediate scrutiny to corporate quotas like SB 826,
however, is relatively straightforward. In Califano v. Webster,23 the
Court addressed whether a provision in the Social Security Act that
calculates benefits for women in a more advantageous way is
unconstitutional because it directly compensates women for past
economic and employment discrimination.24 The Court found that the
favorable treatment of women was justified because the provision’s
purpose was to redress society’s longstanding disparate treatment of
women.25 Allowing women to benefit favorably through their wage is
constitutional.26 This is directly relevant and applicable to SB 826,
which claims that adding women on corporate boards responds to
years of gender discrimination in these California companies.27 Yet,
neither of the plaintiffs acknowledges Califano in their complaints
opposing SB 826.28 This seems odd when Califano addresses a
situation where differing treatment of men and women is justified and,
even more specifically, a situation like SB 826, which tries to remedy
discrimination against women in the job market.
Improving access to corporate opportunities for women is not
only necessary but also constitutional. This Note argues for the
constitutionality of female corporate quotas, such as California’s SB
826. Part II briefly summarizes the history of the Equal Protection
Clause in regard to gender-based classifications and intermediate
scrutiny, and the development of California’s SB 826 and corporate
quotas. Part III applies the modern Equal Protection Clause framework
of intermediate scrutiny to SB 826. Part IV addresses the current
lawsuits and opposition against SB 826 and California’s mandated
quotas in the context of the Califano decision. Part V considers the

21. 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
22. Id. at 53.
23. 430 U.S. 313 (1977).
24. Id. at 313–14.
25. Id. at 317.
26. Id. at 318.
27. See S.B. 826, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
28. See Complaint, Meland v. Padilla, supra note 11, at 6–7; Amended Complaint, Crest v.
Padilla, supra note 11, at 4–5.
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future potential consequences of corporate quotas for the courts and
society. Part VI concludes.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Development of the Equal Protection Clause
in Regard to Gender Discrimination
When the United States Constitution was written, it contained no
laws affording its citizens equal protection of the laws.29 The
Fourteenth Amendment, along with the Equal Protection Clause, was
added after the Civil War in response to the widespread discrimination
against former slaves.30 The Fourteenth Amendment, however, did not
apply to women, and women could not vote until the passage of the
Nineteenth Amendment.31 Married women also could not contract,
hold property, litigate for themselves, or control their own earnings.32
With such few rights clearly laid out for women, few women felt the
need to litigate gender equality suits after the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the few women who tried were
unsuccessful.33
During the 1970s, the Supreme Court adhered to a two-tier
standard of review for equal protection claims: strict scrutiny and
rational basis review.34 The standard of review was determined by the
classification.35 A classification is the denial of rights to a group made
of similarly situated individuals while granting these same rights to
other groups.36 Strict scrutiny is applied to suspect classifications,
which include race and national origin.37 To survive strict scrutiny, the
classification used by the government must be narrowly tailored to

29. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); George B. Daniels & Rachel Pereira, Equal
Protection as a Vehicle for Equal Access and Opportunity: Constance Baker Motley and the
Fourteenth Amendment in Education Cases, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1779, 1785 (2017).
30. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 725 (Wolters Kluwer 5th ed. 2017).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 725.
32. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth Amendment and Equal
Rights Amendments, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 161, 162–63 (1979); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at
883.
33. Ginsburg, supra note 32, at 163.
34. Id. at 164.
35. See id.
36. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 726–27.
37. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217 (1944), abrogated on other
grounds by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018).
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serve a compelling government interest.38 A rational basis standard of
review is applied to non-suspect classifications, which include age,
disability, wealth, and sexual orientation.39 To survive a rational basis
review, the classification merely needs to be rationally related to a
legitimate government purpose.40 At the time, it was unclear which
standard of review would apply to gender or sex classifications. Sex
was similar to race and national origin because it was an immutable
and immediately visible characteristic, and additionally, there were
biological differences between females and males.41 Intermediate
scrutiny, which is how gender classifications are currently reviewed,
did not appear until later when courts tried to fit gender classifications
into one of these two existing standards of review.42
In 1971, the Supreme Court first invalidated a gender
classification in Reed v. Reed,43 where the Court held that an Idaho
law was unconstitutional because the government’s claimed purpose
of administrative convenience—that it was cheaper to choose men—
was unreasonable and merely arbitrary.44 At the time, the Court stated
that it applied a rational basis standard of review, but if the Court had
truly applied rational basis review, the law would have been upheld
because the classification would have been rationally related to the
purpose that it was administratively cheaper to choose men.
Only two years later, in Frontiero v. Richardson,45 the Supreme
Court applied strict scrutiny because sex, like race and national origin,
could have been considered an inherently suspect classification.46 The
Court claimed that sex was a suspect classification because there was
a history of gender-based classifications used for purposeful
discrimination, gender was an immutable characteristic, gender
impacted women’s ability to influence the political process, and
38. Id. at 219 (holding that the executive order ordering Japanese-Americans to move to
relocation camps classifying on race and national origin did not violate the Equal Protection Clause
because there was a compelling government interest of national security).
39. See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312–13 (1976).
40. Id. at 314 (holding that the Massachusetts statute requiring police officers to retire at age
fifty, classifying on basis of age, was constitutional because it furthered a legitimate state goal of
ensuring physical health and vitality of police officers).
41. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 883.
42. See generally id. at 883–97 (describing the history of intermediate scrutiny).
43. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
44. Id. at 74.
45. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
46. Id. at 683–88 (explaining how and why sex and gender are not non-suspect classifications
and are closer to the suspect classifications of race and national origin).

(9) 53.3_KIM (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

MANDATING WOMEN: DEFENDING SB 826

6/18/2020 4:59 PM

691

gender-based discrimination was typically based on stereotypes and
stigmas that had no relationship to an individual’s actual capabilities.47
In 1976, the Court adopted and agreed on an intermediate scrutiny
standard of review as the appropriate level of review for gender
classifications in Craig v. Boren.48 The Court set forth a new standard
of review stating that in order “[t]o withstand constitutional challenge
. . . classifications by gender must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives.”49 Since Craig, the Court has reaffirmed an intermediate
level of scrutiny for gender classifications.50 In the Supreme Court’s
evaluation of gender classifications in Virginia, the Court used
intermediate scrutiny.51 Virginia Military Institute (VMI), a male-only
school that excluded women, relied entirely on outdated and
overbroad gender stereotypes of the legal, social, and economic
inferiority of women, which were not substantially related to an
important government purpose.52 Most recently in 2001, the Supreme
Court decided another gender classification case with Nguyen.53 At
issue was the citizenship statute that made it more difficult for a child
born abroad and out of wedlock to a United States father to claim
citizenship than if the child were born to a Untied States mother under
the same circumstances.54 The Court held that a citizenship statute was
constitutional.55
Since the Court’s examination of gender-based classifications in
the 1970s, it has applied all three levels of scrutiny. Therefore, it is
currently unclear how the Court will apply intermediate scrutiny to
regulations classifying on the basis of gender in the future.56 Will the
Court continue using the traditional intermediate level of scrutiny,
47. Id.
48. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
49. Id. at 197.
50. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 892 (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515
(1996); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89 (1979); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388
(1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316–17 (1977)).
51. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
52. Id. at 534.
53. Nguyen v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
54. Id. at 59–60.
55. Id. at 60–61.
56. Desiree Palomares, Comment, The Fallacy of the Intermediate Scrutiny Analysis, 97
DENV. L.F. 95, 98 (2019) (“Although the Supreme Court has designated the intermediate scrutiny
standard for gender-based classifications, there is little guidance for the proper application of the
standard.”).
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which was created to exist in between strict scrutiny and a rational
basis review? Or depending on the understanding of the rule, will the
Court possibly revert to using a stricter understanding of intermediate
scrutiny as articulated by Justice Ginsburg in Virginia? Many scholars
and lower court judges believe that the majority’s interpretation of
intermediate scrutiny in Virginia, which required “an exceedingly
persuasive justification” for gender classification applied a more
rigorous standard of review closer to strict scrutiny.57 It created some
confusion about how intermediate scrutiny should be applied, and
whether it was even applicable to gender-based classifications.58
Scholars have argued that in direct defiance of Virginia’s new stricter
and heightened intermediate scrutiny, courts swung back to the
previously known intermediate level of scrutiny that a gender-based
classification must be substantially related to an important government
purpose.59
Yet, when looking at corporate quotas, or any other gender-based
affirmative action set forth by governments attempting to reverse prior
discrimination, the Court, and even the lower courts, have been
relatively straightforward in how they apply intermediate scrutiny.60
In Califano, the Court upheld a Social Security provision allowing
women to eliminate low-earning years from the calculation of their
benefits because it remedied past discrimination.61 Laws that are “selfconsciously and deliberately” set forth to compensate for years of

57. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 571–74 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority raised the
level of scrutiny to strict scrutiny, which was unprecedented); Heather L. Stoboaugh, Comment,
The Aftermath of United States v. Virginia: Why Five Justices Are Pulling in the Reins on the
“Exceedingly Persuasive Justification”, 55 SMU L. REV. 1755, 1755 (2002) (stating that
Ginsburg’s use of “exceedingly persuasive justification” in the majority opinion led to a stricter
test for gender-based classifications).
58. See generally Palomares, supra note 56, at 96–97 (courts applying the “substantially
related” framework).
59. Id.; see also Amy Hinkley, Note, Scrutinize This!: The Questionable Constitutionality of
Gender-Conscious Admissions Policies Utilized by Public Universities, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 339, 350
(2010) (“Regardless of the standard applied, the Court’s method of determining whether a
challenged classification has violated the Equal Protection Clause involves a review of the asserted
purpose for the classification and a review of the relationship between the purpose and the
challenged classification.”).
60. See Angelo Guisado, Reversal of Fortune: The Inapposite Standards Applied to Remedial
Race-, Gender-, and Orientation-Based Classifications, 92 NEB. L. REV. 1, 34 (2013) (“The
majority of circuit courts have adhered to a consistent application of intermediate scrutiny in
assessing gender-based classifications regardless of invidious or remedial purpose.”).
61. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 314–16 (1977).
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gender discrimination are constitutional.62 The favorable treatment of
the “female wage earner enacted here was not a result of ‘archaic and
overbroad generalizations’ about women” or any kind of stereotypes
about women.63 Ultimately, while there are areas that the lower courts
and the Supreme Court still have to address with regard to rules on
gender-based classifications, the favorable treatment of women in the
job market has been addressed, and the Court has ruled it
constitutional.64
B. Development of California SB 826 and Corporate Quotas
Historically, most corporate boards are comprised of men, and
even as gender gaps are closing, 99 percent of corporate boards of
directors are still predominantly male.65 These corporate boards are
essential to a company’s life because they make decisions in directing
and overseeing the actions of both the company and the chief
executive officer.66 In a direct effort to bring females into these
boardrooms, SB 826 was passed by the California state legislature. SB
826 requires foreign and domestic publicly-held companies in
California to have at least one woman on their board of directors by
the end of 2019, and more women by the end of 2021 (depending on
the size of the board).67 If corporations do not follow these guidelines,
they will be subject to a fine.68 In the findings supporting SB 826, the
California legislature noted the importance of a corporate quota as
“studies predict[ed] that it [would] take over 40 or 50 years to achieve
gender parity, if something [was] not done proactively” and also

62. Id. at 320 (emphasizing that the statute in question was “deliberately enacted to
compensate for particular economic disabilities suffered by women”); see also John E. Morrison,
Viva La Diferencia: A Non-Solution to the Difference Dilemma, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 973, 974–76
(1994) (discussing the debate of whether equality means “having the same rules apply to everyone,
or having the rules apply the same to everyone”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutionalizing
Women’s Equality, 90 CAL. L. REV. 735, 746 (2002) (“[L]aws self-consciously and deliberately
enacted to compensate for past discrimination against women . . . might be upheld.”).
63. Califano, 430 U.S. at 317 (citing Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975))
(discussing stereotypes about women “such as casual assumptions that women are ‘the weaker sex’
or are more likely to be child-rearers or dependents”); see also Morrison, supra note 62, at 975
(discussing implicit assumptions about women).
64. See Califano, 430 U.S. at 320.
65. Jeff Green et al., Wanted: 3,732 Women to Govern Corporate America, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2019-women-on-boards/.
66. Id.
67. S.B. 826, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
68. Id.
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highlighted that companies would perform better because boards tend
to work more effectively with female members.69
California’s new law has been controversial because it is
perceived as being discriminatory to both men and women.70 In
opposition to SB 826, the California Chamber of Commerce and
twenty-nine California businesses sent a letter to the California Senate
arguing that if the companies were presented with a situation in which
two equally qualified candidates, one male and one female, were
applying for a director position, the company would be forced to
choose the female candidate and deny the male solely because of their
genders.71 From a different perspective, other opponents of these
corporate quotas believe these kinds of female-focused initiatives only
serve to discredit the progress women have already made without
government mandates or quotas and “undermine the achievements of
future female hires.”72
Currently, the two lawsuits objecting to SB 826 claim that the law
violates the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause.73 While one of the
complaints claims that SB 826 expends taxpayer funds and resources,
both are centered around the idea that SB 826 discriminates against
men.74 The courts have yet to rule on the constitutionality of SB 826,
but they will have to answer whether these mandates are constitutional
and will set precedent for the other states that want to implement

69. See id. § 1 (listing the California legislature’s findings about why this bill is necessary for
the progression of gender parity). Contra Laurel Wamsley, California Becomes 1st State to
Require Women on Corporate Boards, NPR (Oct. 1, 2018, 4:47 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/
10/01/653318005/california-becomes-1st-state-to-require-women-on-corporate-boards
(“The Economist also found that some of the benefits touted for increasing the number of women
on boards—such as closing the wage gap between men and women, or having an effect on company
decision-making—haven’t necessarily come to pass.”).
70. See, e.g., Letter from Cal. Chamber of Commerce et al. to Members of Cal. State Senate
(Aug. 30, 2018), http://blob.capitoltrack.com/17blobs/713497c1-4d2f-4865-acb1-6492b4a2ad1c
(opposing SB 826 on the grounds that it would discriminate against males).
71. See id.
72. See, e.g., Anastasia Boden, Op-Ed: Setting Quotas on Women in the Boardroom Is
Probably Unconstitutional. It Also Doesn’t Work, L.A. TIMES (July 8, 2019, 3:05 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-boden-quotas-women-corporate-boardsunconstitutional-20190708-story.html (written by the attorney representing the Pacific Legal
Foundation, the party bringing suit against the California state for SB 826).
73. See Jane Edison Stevenson & Tierney Remick, California Law Mandating Women
Directors Is Challenged, CFO (Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.cfo.com/governance/2019/11/
california-law-mandating-women-directors-is-challenged/.
74. See Complaint, Meland v. Padilla, supra note 11, at 6–7; Amended Complaint, Crest v.
Padilla, supra note 11, at 4–5.
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similar laws. Although California is the first state to pass a mandatory
corporate quota, more states hope to pass similar legislation.75
The issue has also come up in the implementation of gender party
quotas to raise women’s political representation. These quotas would
require a certain percentage of female candidates on a party list.76 The
United States Democratic Party instituted a party level quota with an
Equal Division Rule, which required National Convention delegates
to be equally divided between men and women.77 Similar to corporate
quotas, the Equal Division Rule was also created to encourage
women’s active participation in the political process, rectifying years
of past discrimination towards women in the political process.78 This
rule has also been opposed by men and women as they claim it
restricted men’s voting rights and ultimately created more
inequality.79 Although corporate quotas are a great starting point in
remedying centuries of discrimination against women, the question of
their constitutionality will have to be addressed, especially as many
besides those bringing lawsuits against the state of California have
already begun to weigh in on the issue.80
III. MODERN EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE ANALYSIS OF SB 826
As mentioned above, the Supreme Court and lower courts will
soon have to address whether these female quotas created to combat
gender inequality violate the Equal Protection Clause. In analyzing the
Equal Protection Clause and the female-focused initiatives and quotas,
the first issue the Court must address is how the law classifies.81 All
laws classify because they either try to distinguish or create disparity
in some way, but laws that discriminate are either facially or non-

75. Stevenson & Remick, supra note 73 (stating that several states are considering similar
laws, but similar statutes are already in place in other nations like France and Norway).
76. Lisa Schnall, Note, Party Parity: A Defense of the Democratic Party Equal Division Rule,
13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 381, 382 (2005).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 405.
79. See, e.g., id. at 392 (citing Bachur v. Democratic Nat’l Party, 836 F.2d 837 (4th Cir.
1987)).
80. See Julie C. Suk, Gender Quotas After the End of Men, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1123, 1139 (2013)
(“In the domains where women remain disadvantaged or underrepresented, this tension remains
masked, as the two rationales converge to support positive measures to eradicate women’s
disadvantage. But in the domains where women are beginning to outperform men, should gender
balance be manufactured? This question has direct relevance to the United States.”).
81. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 726.
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facially discriminatory.82 A facial classification exists on the face of
the law when the law draws a distinction based on a particular
characteristic, like race or gender.83 In contrast, a non-facial
classification is facially neutral but has a discriminatory impact and is
passed to achieve a discriminatory purpose.84 Here, corporate quotas
facially classify based on gender because SB 826 requires a minimum
number of women to be on corporate boards.85
Second, the courts will address what level of scrutiny or standard
of review applies. Courts will apply one of three different levels of
review: (1) strict scrutiny; (2) intermediate scrutiny; or (3) rational
basis review.86 As stated above, gender-based classifications are
subject to an intermediate scrutiny, and Califano provides an
analogous precedent to follow and abide by.87
Moreover, in examining the constitutionality of a law, courts
evaluate the law’s ends and means. For intermediate scrutiny, the
government has the burden of proof to show the law’s end is
important.88 Additionally, the means to achieve the end should not be
excessively overinclusive or underinclusive.89 A law is underinclusive
if it fails to include all of the individuals who should be included to
accomplish the law’s purpose or end.90 A law is overinclusive if the
law includes individuals whose inclusion does not help accomplish the
law’s purpose.91 Intermediate scrutiny requires a somewhat close fit,
but it is possible for a law to both be underinclusive and
overinclusive.92 Putting all this together, intermediate scrutiny
examines whether a gender-based classification (means) is
substantially related to an important government interest (end). This
Note will apply intermediate scrutiny as applied by Califano to
82. Id. at 726–27.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 727.
85. S.B. 826, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
86. Kelso, supra note 19, at 227–28.
87. See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 314–19 (1977); Norman T. Deutsch, Nguyen v.
INS and the Application of Intermediate Scrutiny to Gender Classifications: Theory, Practice, and
Reality, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 185, 187–88 (2003) (providing framework for analyzing laws that facially
classify based on gender).
88. See Nguyen v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53, 60 (2001);
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 729.
89. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 729–30.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 730.
92. Id.
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determine whether these affirmative action programs and laws
mandating women meet the required level of scrutiny.
For an intermediate level of review, the government gender
classification, or means, must be substantially related to an important
government interest, or end. The California legislature set forth
specific reasons and purposes for imposing a corporate quota. They
wanted to “boost the California economy, improve opportunities for
women in the workplace, . . . protect California taxpayers,
shareholders, and retirees,” and “achieve gender parity.”93 Similar to
Craig, where the Court referred to statistics showing that 0.18 percent
of females versus 2 percent of males between the ages of eighteen and
twenty were arrested for drunk driving in support of Oklahoma law
banning men under twenty-one from drinking,94 statistics also were
given great weight in support of passing SB 826.95 For example, SB
826 cited to numerous studies which concluded that companies tend
to perform more effectively with women on corporate boards. 96 Other
studies have concluded even the number of women correlates with the
board’s overall effectiveness, as having three women on a board,
rather than one or none, increases the board’s overall effectiveness.97
Unlike in Craig, where the Court held that statistics did not form the
proper basis for gender classification, the statistical evidence here
supports gender classification because the law attempts to create
gender parity and gender is a legitimate proxy for corporate quotas.98
The ends for female-specific corporate quotas are premised on
promoting women’s interest in corporate positions, raising confidence
of women to participate in these positions, expanding opportunities for
women in areas traditionally dominated by men, and even reducing
barriers for men seeking entry into “female fields.”99 Under Califano
and a traditional intermediate scrutiny analysis, the end here would be
important. In gender-based affirmative action cases, the Court has

93. S.B. 826, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
94. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 201–02 (1976).
95. S.B. 826, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
96. See id. § 1(c)–(g).
97. Id.
98. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 201–02.
99. See NAT’L COAL. FOR WOMEN & GIRLS IN EDUC., supra note 8, at 1; STEM for Girls,
UNIV. OF CAL. DAVIS, https://wrrc.ucdavis.edu/programs/academic/stem-4-girls (last visited
Feb. 23, 2020) (advertising a public university’s STEM program for young girls to build confidence
and foster interest in joining STEM fields).

(9) 53.3_KIM (DO NOT DELETE)

6/18/2020 4:59 PM

698

[Vol. 53:685

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

accepted remedying societal gender discrimination and differences in
opportunities as an “important governmental objective.”100
Applying intermediate scrutiny, California is likely to show an
exceedingly persuasive justification for including women in the
boardroom. Unlike Virginia, in which a male-only school in Virginia
tried to defend its single-sex school system by using overbroad
generalizations about women and their abilities, the purpose and
justification of California’s corporate quota in improving
opportunities for women in the boardroom does not rely on stereotypes
about the legal or economic inferiority of women.101 Justice Ginsburg,
in the majority opinion of Virginia, and the per curiam opinion of
Califano, clearly stated that gender-based classifications may be used
to compensate women for economic disabilities and to promote equal
employment opportunities and that these are exceedingly persuasive
justifications.102 The Court does not tolerate laws grounded in “archaic
and overbroad generalizations” about women, like that a woman’s role
is only in the home, not the corporate workplace.103 Nor does the court
tolerate any laws based on a traditional notion that women depend on
men financially.104
On the other hand, opponents of these quotas may argue that such
justification is not exceedingly persuasive because a rights-based
framework is designed to guard against exclusion or any explicit
discrimination.105 Although there is a history of women who were
unable to join corporate board positions, SB 826 only expands the
diversity of women and denies opportunities to men. In Virginia, the
Court stated that a policy denying women an equal opportunity to
participate and contribute to society their individual talents simply
because they were women was unconstitutional and violated the Equal
Protection Clause.106 The majority in Virginia was only seeking to put
forth a public policy argument that a male-only school violated the
Equal Protection Clause by denying women and did not consider that

100. See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 722–25, 728–29 (1982)
(intermediate scrutiny must be applied free of fixed stereotypes about men’s and women’s abilities).
101. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 515–16, 532–33 (1996).
102. Id. at 533; Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977).
103. Lauren Sudeall Lucas, A Dilemma of Doctrinal Design: Rights, Identity, and the WorkFamily Conflict, 8 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 379, 384 (2013) (citing Craig, 429 U.S. at 198).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 385.
106. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532.
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a female-only policy could have a similar discriminatory effect and,
therefore, could also be unconstitutional.107 Economic disparity
favoring females is exceedingly persuasive when evaluating the
history of women in the workplace, but economic disparity favoring
males is not.108
Pacific Legal Foundation, one of the parties bringing suit against
California in relation to SB 826, contends that women have been
making progress in corporate environments without quotas or laws
and do not need the unsolicited help.109 While it is true that statistically
women have been making progress, corporate boardrooms have other
barriers to entry that women have been unable to overcome.110
Vacancies on a board of directors are rare, and when there is an
opening, a personal connection or recommendation of a current
director, who is almost always a man, wins out.111 Another argument
against quotas is that in the pursuit of including women, men are
excluded as a result. A common example involves one male and one
female candidate applying for the same position, requiring a company
to be forced to choose the female candidate to meet its quota. This is
a valid concern, but according to Califano, it would be reasonable to
give the position to the female candidate, who has lived in and is a
product of years of discrimination in labor and economics, if both
candidates are equally qualified.112 Ultimately, a court will be likely
to conclude that California can show an exceedingly persuasive
justification for corporate board quotas.
The relationship between the means and end of creating gender
parity in the boardroom is a very tight fit. Although women are slowly
beginning to hold executive and senior positions, there is still a very
small percentage of women in board seats.113 The job market has been,
107. See id. at 532–33.
108. See Deborah Brake et al., Centennial Panel: Two Decades of Intermediate Scrutiny:
Evaluating Equal Protection for Women, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 1, 6 n.32 (1997).
109. See Boden, supra note 72.
110. See Green et al., supra note 65.
111. Id.
112. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 313–14 (1977).
113. See S.B. 826, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Cal. 2018) (“As of June 2017, among the
446 publicly traded companies included in the Russell 3000 index and headquartered in California,
representing nearly $5 trillion in market capitalization, women directors held 566 seats, or 15.5
percent of seats, while men held 3,089 seats, or 84.5 percent of seats. More than one-quarter,
numbering 117, or 26 percent, of the Russell 3000 companies based in California have NO women
directors serving on their boards.”); WARNER ET AL., supra note 10, at 1, 5 (women only hold 19
percent of the S&P 1500 board seats).
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and is still, inhospitable to women unless they are seeking lower-paid
jobs.114 Accordingly, this California law only seeks to include women
on a corporate board of directors and does not allow room for
individuals whose inclusion would not help create gender parity.
Although SB 826 has a lot of problems and leaves loopholes for
corporations to find an out, it does signify a step towards gender equity
in the boardroom, which affects large corporate business decisions.
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF SETTING FORTH A
DRASTIC CHANGE LIKE SB 826
In 2018, SB 826 passed, and according to some projections,
California can expect to have 692 new women on boards of directors
by 2021.115 Although this law sounds ambitious, many have pointed
out that a number of California companies are incorporated in
Delaware.116 Those incorporated in Delaware may not have principal
executive offices in California and would likely not have to follow this
rule.117 In spite of this, two suits have been filed against the state of
California (and many more are likely to follow), which claim that the
law mandating women is unconstitutional and violates the Equal
Protection Clause.118
Although these female-focused measures and mandated laws
were set forth in hopes of creating gender parity, they have received a
lot of public backlash. California’s corporate quota is the first of its
kind in the United States, and there are already lawsuits claiming it is
unconstitutional.119 This kind of response is not completely surprising.
A law mandating women on a corporate board is an extremely direct,
straightforward way of injecting change into the corporate world. The
California Chamber of Commerce and the various other businesses
who wrote the letter to the California Senate opposing SB 826 reacted

114. Califano, 430 U.S. at 318.
115. See S.B. 826, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018); Green et al., supra note 65.
116. Green et al., supra note 65.
117. See Teal N. Trujillo, Note, Do We Need to Secure a Place at the Table for Women? An
Analysis of the Legality of California Law SB-826, 45 J. LEGIS. 324, 329 (2019) (while SB 826
does not mention the company’s place of incorporation, raising a question of whether the law
applies to companies incorporated outside of California, supporters of the law rely on section
2115.5 of the California Corporations Code to argue for the law’s applicability to foreign
corporations).
118. Stevenson & Remick, supra note 73.
119. Id.
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in a predictable manner.120 They emphasized that they were not
opposed to creating more gender diversity on boards but that they did
not like the manner in which SB 826 sought to accomplish this goal.121
They made a valid point that gender is not the only measure of
diversity and expressed their concerns of having to potentially
displace current male board members.122 Yet, SB 826 and other
measures like it are necessary to institute actual change.
SB 826 symbolizes a movement. If California’s corporate quota
is deemed constitutional, other states will likely follow suit by drafting
similar bills or passing similar pending legislation.123 If all states in
the United States were to instill the same kind of change and all
companies in the Russell 3000 had to put women on their board of
directors, 3,732 board seats would need to open for women, and the
number of women on these boards would increase by around 75
percent.124 On its face, SB 826 and any female quotas to bring forth
economic equality like that of Califano seek a positive change to
reduce and remedy gender discrimination.
V. WHY IS “QUOTA” SUCH A ROUSING, STIRRING WORD?
DIFFERING VIEWPOINTS OF SB 826 AND THE LOWER COURTS
Given the historical and political context of a female quota and
the changing role of women in the workplace (and especially a
corporate workplace), it is understandable why there is such a variety
of opinions weighing in on SB 826. A quota is perceived and
understood as a “hard” remedy because it is a more aggressive and a
more straightforward method of imposing equality than a “soft”
remedy like affirmative action, which merely gives guidelines for
organizations to follow and implement as they see fit.125 Opponents of
SB 826 and female quotas assert that the laws intrude on the publicprivate sector spheres.126 Indeed, one of the complaints filed opposing
SB 826 alleges that the plaintiff companies and shareholders have paid
120. See Letter from Cal. Chamber of Commerce, supra note 70.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Stevenson & Remick, supra note 73.
124. Green et al., supra note 65.
125. See Darren Rosenblum, Loving Gender Balance: Reframing Identity-Based Inequality
Remedies, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2873, 2874 (2008); Tracy A. Thomas, Reconsidering the Remedy
of
Gender
Quotas,
HARV. J. L. & GENDER ONLINE
1,
3
(2016),
https://harvardjlg.com/2016/11/reconsidering-the-remedy-of-gender-quotas/.
126. Rosenblum, supra note 125, at 2880.
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income taxes and various other taxes to the state of California and that
this money and other taxpayer’s funds would be illegally expended in
carrying out and implementing SB 826.127 Opponents of female quotas
argue that a quota is a public regulation interfering with the operations
of a private organization or corporation.128 In the selection process of
an equally qualified female and male candidate, forcing the private
company to choose the female candidate would allow the government
to take part in the organization’s decision-making.129
This type of government interference is especially significant
because a corporate board of directors typically makes the decisions
dictating the future of the company. It is true that this government
interference is a shortcoming in incorporating quotas, but it is a risk
necessary in creating gender balance and an attitude that needs to be
changed when it comes to remedying discrimination. Countries like
Norway, which already have corporate female quotas and measures
that emphasize equal opportunities in education, employment, and
professional advancement, understand that the extremely close
interaction of the public and private sectors is experimental.130 This
experimentation, however, may explain why places like Norway have
high economic competition rankings and maintain a form of
democracy with health, education, and unemployment benefits.131 In
times like today, where private organizations cannot remedy
discrimination, it may be necessary to shift the burden.
Another argument is that SB 826 discredits the progress women
have made in climbing the corporate ladder without any kind of
government regulation or public interference.132 Although women
have made significant progress in the corporate boardroom,
government interference has been directly impactful in schools
through Title IX.133 Title IX bans discrimination based on gender in
127. See Amended Complaint, Crest v. Padilla, supra note 11, at 4–5.
128. Rosenblum, supra note 125, at 2880.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 2879.
131. Id. at 2879 n.37.
132. See Complaint, Meland v. Padilla, supra note 11, at 1; California’s “Woman Quota”
Targeted in New Lawsuit, PAC. LEGAL FOUND. (Nov. 13, 2019), https://pacificlegal.org/pressrelease/californias-woman-quota-targeted-in-new-lawsuit/; Creighton Meland v. Alex Padilla,
Secretary of State of California: Fighting California’s Discriminatory Woman Quota Law, PAC.
LEGAL FOUND., https://pacificlegal.org/case/creighton-meland-v-alex-padilla-secretary-of-stateof-california/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2020).
133. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EQUAL ACCESS TO EDUCATION: FORTY YEARS OF TITLE IX
2 (2012), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2012/06/20/titleixreport.pdf.
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any federally funded educational programs.134 Some private and
public schools receive federal funds and, as a result, must comply with
Title IX.135 Since Title IX’s enactment, there have been significant
improvements in educational access for women with increased high
school and college graduation rates—the number of women with
college degrees has more than tripled since 1968—and women now
have more advanced degrees than their male counterparts.136 While
Title IX created and advanced educational opportunities for women,
there are still barriers that may take time to overcome. Women still
earn less than half of bachelor degrees earned in STEM-based
(Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) fields.137 In
2017, women received only 19.1% of the bachelor degrees in
computer science, 21.5% in engineering, and 41.7% in
mathematics.138 STEM-based education opportunities are particularly
important for women as people become increasingly more reliant on
technology.
As a result of this high demand for workers, the national average
salary for those with STEM-based education ($87,000) is significantly
higher than that of a middle-skill occupation.139 Schools and private
organizations also created scholarships specifically for female
students.140 Many of these scholarships were funded directly by public
and private schools to encourage female participation in STEM and
“84% of about 220 universities offer single-gender scholarships, many

134. Id. at 1.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 2–3.
137. Josh Trapani & Katherine Hale, Higher Education in Science and Engineering, NAT’L
SCI. FOUND. (Sept. 4, 2019), https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsb20197/demographic-attributes-of-s-edegree-recipients#s-e-degrees-by-sex.
138. Id.
139. See Why Are There So Few Women in STEM?, W. GOVERNORS UNIV. (July 1, 2019),
https://www.wgu.edu/blog/why-are-there-so-few-women-in-stem1907.html; see also NAT’L
COAL. FOR WOMEN & GIRLS IN EDUC., supra note 8, at 4 (“Middle-skill occupations where women
dominate (making up 75% or more of the workforce) pay median wages of just 66 cents for every
dollar in middle-skill occupations where men similarly dominate.”).
140. See, e.g., Female Scholarships, SCHOLARSHIPS.COM, https://www.scholarships.com/
financial-aid/college-scholarships/scholarship-directory/gender/female (last visited Feb. 23, 2020)
(listing different scholarships offered exclusively to females and women); Kenny Sandorffy,
Scholarships for Women in STEM, SCHOLARSHIP OWL (Dec. 4, 2019), https://scholarshipowl.com/
blog/find-scholarships/scholarships-for-women-in-stem/ (“There are many organizations and
programs that want to encourage young female students to enter the fields of STEM. They do this
by awarding college scholarships.”).
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of them in STEM fields.”141 57 percent of universities are engaged in
sex-specific scholarship practices that are facially discriminatory,
which means that they offer five or more scholarships that are genderspecific.142 Universities also have tried more concrete measures to
foster female participation such as altering their curriculum and
courses. Harvey Mudd College, a college widely known for its STEMcentered education, “revis[ed] the introductory computing course and
split[] it into two levels divided by experience,” “provid[ed] research
opportunities for undergraduates after their first year in college,” and
sent its female students to a national conference gathering together
prominent women in technology.143 Other universities and colleges
have also been offering female-only awards, professional
development workshops, and summer camps for middle school and
high school students.144 Ultimately, the government’s attempt to create
equitable opportunities for women in education has been revolutionary
for women’s progress in schools and in their careers after education,
and sets an example of what is possible with the implementation of SB
826.
Another issue that arose in the discussion of the constitutionality
of SB 826 is which standard of scrutiny applies. Some scholars argue
that Virginia and Nguyen set forth two different understandings of the
standards of review, and it is currently unclear how the courts will
proceed and scrutinize gender-based classifications.145 Currently,
intermediate scrutiny seems rather arbitrary and is subject to many
different interpretations.146 On the road to and from intermediate
141. Teresa Watanabe, Women-Only STEM College Programs Under Attack for Male
Discrimination, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/
2019-08-20/women-only-science-programs-discrimination-complaints
(citing
Sex-Specific
Scholarships, STOP ABUSIVE & VIOLENT ENV’TS, http://www.saveservices.org/equity/
scholarships/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2020)).
142. Sex-Specific Scholarships, STOP ABUSIVE & VIOLENT ENV’TS,
http://www.saveservices.org/equity/scholarships/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2020).
143. CHRISTIANNE CORBBET & CATHERINE HILL, SOLVING THE EQUATION: THE VARIABLES
FOR
WOMEN’S
SUCCESS
IN
ENGINEERING
AND
COMPUTING
4
(2015),
https://www.aauw.org/app/uploads/2020/03/Solving-the-Equation-report-nsa.pdf.
144. Watanabe, supra note 141.
145. See Ajmel Quereshi, The Forgotten Remedy: A Legal and Theoretical Defense of
Intermediate Scrutiny for Gender-Based Affirmative Action Programs, 21 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 797, 799 (2013); Kelso, supra note 19, at 238 (“[T]he opinion ultimately seemed to
require that the State of Virginia show an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for its gender
discrimination at the Virginia Military Institute (VMI), not merely a substantial relationship to
important government interests.”).
146. Quereshi, supra note 145, at 799.
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scrutiny, the Court has gone from applying rational basis, to creating
an intermediate standard of review, to a more rigorous intermediate
scrutiny closer to strict scrutiny, and then back to the original
intermediate standard of review.147 This is incredibly problematic as
the Supreme Court continues to apply intermediate scrutiny to gender
classifications to fit certain Justices’ ideologies, instead of applying
the standards of review based on theory.148
The lower courts and California courts have tried to address this.
The Sixth Circuit and Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals have applied
strict scrutiny when reviewing cases involving gender-based
classifications.149 In California, a lower court has concluded that
gender is a suspect classification and, therefore, is subject to strict
scrutiny review.150 The specific regulation at issue in the California
case was distinct from SB 826 and the Social Security provision in
Califano because the law in Califano gave preferential treatment
without emphasizing stereotypes and was created to remedy
discrimination. In addition, the California court went on to state that
race-based classifications are not subject to strict scrutiny merely
because they are “race conscious.”151 Nevertheless, applying strict
scrutiny at a state level in California may lead to a different result
because, according to the court, the ultimate goal of the Equal
Protection Clause is the elimination of factors like race from public
decisions.152
There is a tension in legal thought as some believe Virginia ended
up creating a more rigorous, stricter version of intermediate scrutiny,
which required a showing of “exceedingly persuasive justification” for
any classification.153 Justice Ginsburg, who authored the majority
opinion in Virginia, emphasized the importance of having a genuine,
actual purpose for a gender classification.154 The purpose must not be
hypothesized simply to defend equal protection litigation, and it
147. See id. at 800–22.
148. See, e.g., Nguyen v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53 (2001); United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
149. Quereshi, supra note 145, at 813–14.
150. Connerly v. State Personnel Bd., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5, 19–20 (Ct. App. 2001) (Crest v.
Padilla’s Amended Complaint cites to this case and it is also important to note that Pacific Legal
Foundation was one of the defendants in this case).
151. Id. at 29.
152. Id.
153. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 524.
154. Id. at 533.
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should not rely on overbroad generalizations or stereotypes.155 Justice
Ginsburg has consistently been a leading advocate for gender equality
and equal rights for women, and ultimately, VMI and their mission
were in direct defiance of equal protection and the fundamental values
Justice Ginsburg stands for.156 Justice Ginsburg is famously known for
saying, “[W]hen do you think it will be enough? When will there be
enough women on the court? And my answer is when there are
nine.”157
Justice Ginsburg, however, has been highly criticized for moving
gender from a “quasi-suspect” type of a classification to a suspect
classification similar to race and national origin in pursuit of her own
principles.158 Some claim that Nguyen was the retaliation and reversal
of Ginsburg’s decision by the other Justices on the Supreme Court.159
It seems as though the Justices fail to agree on how to apply these
levels of scrutiny.160
Even if Justice Ginsburg pushed gender from an intermediate
standard of review to something closer to strict scrutiny, the theory of
suspect classification that triggers a heightened level of scrutiny
should be applied in evaluating gender. In Frontiero, the Court set
forth five factors that can change a non-suspect classification to a
suspect classification.161 The first factor requires a showing of a
history of purposeful discrimination and how similar the classification
is to a suspect classification.162 As mentioned above, similar to those
of minority race and national origin, women have a history of being
discriminated against and excluded. Even the post-Civil War
amendments, like the Fourteenth Amendment, originally did not apply
to women. The second factor considers whether there is an immutable
characteristic.163 Gender is usually highly visible, but unlike race and
155. Id.
156. See Ginsburg, supra note 32, at 177–78.
157. When Will There Be Enough Women on the Supreme Court? Justice Ginsburg Answers
That Question, PBS NEWSHOUR (Feb. 5, 2015, 7:48 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/
justice-ginsburg-enough-women-supreme-court.
158. Stoboaugh, supra note 57, at 1755–56.
159. Id. at 1756–57.
160. Id. at 1779; see also Ozan O. Varol, Strict in Theory, but Accommodating in Fact?, 75
MO. L. REV. 1243, 1280 (2010) (highlighting that the Virginia Court engaged in a more exacting
analysis under intermediate scrutiny than the Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), Court did
under strict scrutiny).
161. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682–88 (1973).
162. Id. at 684.
163. Id. at 686.
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national origin, it is something that you may change after birth. The
third factor examines to what extent the classification impacts political
power.164 Women have a history of powerlessness in the political
system, despite being in a numerical majority. Women have been and
continue to be underrepresented in the legislature: only 24 percent of
seats in Congress and 28 percent of seats in the state legislatures are
filled by women.165 The fourth factor considers whether the
discrimination against the class, simply based on the classification, is
grossly unfair.166 As stated in Virginia, it seems unfair to discriminate
against similarly situated people when there is no real relation between
gender and the ability to perform or contribute to society.167 Finally,
the fifth factor inquires whether the classification is based on
stereotypes and stigmas, which was heavily emphasized in Virginia.168
The Frontiero factors here are mostly met, and thus, gender should
trigger heightened scrutiny. Ultimately, however, the Frontiero
factors are not determinative, and although gender is similar to race
and origin, they are not the same and should not be deemed to be a
part of the same suspect classification.
On the other hand, strict scrutiny is warranted because
governments should not be allowed to create laws that discriminate or
distinguish between genders, especially on their face and based on
stereotypes about men and women. Justice Ginsburg adequately
described her concern for the laws that reinforced outdated ideas about
the physical, economical, and legal inferiority of women.169 The main
concern, however, with applying strict scrutiny to gender-based
classifications is that it allows for the courts to strike down affirmative
action.170 There are various programs currently in place, including
scholarships and female-only educational programs that explicitly
exclude men or give an advantage to women. In 1972, Title IX was
federally enacted by Congress to try and shift the statistical gender gap

164. Id. at 685–86.
165. WARNER ET AL., supra note 10, at 2.
166. See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 685.
167. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996).
168. Id. at 533–34; see also Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 685 (“[O]ur statute books gradually became
laden with gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes and, indeed, throughout much of the
19th century the position of women in our society was, in many respects, comparable to that of
blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes.”).
169. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533–34.
170. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 884.
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in schools.171 Title IX bans discrimination “on the basis of sex” in
schools or in “any education program[s] or activit[ies] receiving
Federal financial assistance.”172 If strict scrutiny were applied,
affirmative action for women in education would be struck down as
not being narrowly tailored enough to serve a compelling government
interest.173 Even if there is a compelling government interest, the
classification under strict scrutiny is allowed only if no less restrictive
alternative is available.174 Opponents of affirmative action could and
would be able to list various alternatives to female quotas.
“Intermediate scrutiny truly is a middle ground which allows
challenges to laws that facially classify on the basis of gender and
upholds such laws if they pursue gender equality. Additionally,
intermediate scrutiny allows for a semi-loose or semi-tight fit
compared to the “tight” fit of strict scrutiny and “loose” fit required by
rational basis review. Strict scrutiny would be harmful to our current
social, political, and legal progress, and to the same values that Justice
Ginsburg advocates for. In order for intermediate scrutiny to work,
however, it needs to be standardized and carefully laid out. Attack of
California’s corporate quota mandating women or any similar statute
would be a great opportunity for the Supreme Court to address a
gender classification because it has such drastic means to reach an
equitable end.
Nguyen seemed to try to move scrutiny applied to gender
classifications back to the intermediate standard of review created by
Craig. The Court in Nguyen acknowledged that with intermediate
scrutiny, the fit between the means and end must be “exceedingly
persuasive.”175 In applying this standard from Virginia, the Court
clarified that “exceedingly persuasive justification” is established by
showing the classification served an important government purpose
and the means employed were substantially related to the achievement

171. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EQUAL ACCESS TO EDUCATION: FORTY YEARS OF TITLE IX,
supra note 133, at 2; see 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2015).
172. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2015).
173. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 727 (“Under strict scrutiny, a law is upheld if it is
proven necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose. The government must have a truly
significant reason for discriminating, and it must show that it cannot achieve its objective through
any less discriminatory alternative.”).
174. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring
in part).
175. Nguyen v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53, 70 (2001).
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of that objective.176 Although Nguyen did not clearly state how the
Court planned to address gender classifications and it only addressed
a citizenship statute, which could have been addressed via plenary
power, it still tried to solve the problem created by Virginia and stuck
to the intermediate level of scrutiny created for a “quasi-suspect”
classification.177
Some claim that the Court has been applying rational basis review
to gender classifications simply disguised as strict scrutiny and
intermediate scrutiny.178 As the courts move towards using a rational
basis plus model, it becomes more difficult to distinguish between the
three levels of scrutiny.179 Stating gender is a non-suspect
classification subject to a rational basis review may be beneficial in
creating more female-focused initiatives to combat years of past
gender discrimination. It also creates an equal effect for the opposing
field of thought. Although more laws would classify on the basis of
gender for proper ends, it could allow for laws that discriminate
against women simply because a rational basis review permits a very
loose fit between a law’s means and its proposed end. This is not to
say that rational basis is completely deferential to a government’s
means and ends. While rational basis is still a legitimate level of
scrutiny, the Court has afforded it flexibility.180
Some legal scholars and professionals also believe that the Court
has actually been using seven different standards of review in its
analyses and suggest explicitly setting forth multiple levels of
scrutiny.181 These models add “plus” for each of the three levels of
scrutiny to create more gradients for separate, distinct sets of facts.182
It seems unlikely, however, that a model with even more levels of
scrutiny would create predictability and guidance for the lower
courts.183 Such a system would likely lead to more confusion and leave
more room for the lower courts to implement their own ideologies and
beliefs. The lower courts are not immune to the political process and
parties. To maintain transparency in evaluating laws that distinguish
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id.
Deutsch, supra note 87, at 270.
See, e.g., id.
Id. at 186–88.
Id. at 213.
See, e.g., Kelso, supra note 19, at 256.
Id.
Contra id. at 256–57.
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or discriminate in some way, a simple theoretical model would be
most beneficial for the lower courts.
Admittedly, intermediate scrutiny needs to be rethought, but it
does not require a complete overhaul of the current equal protection
analysis. Moving forward, the Court should follow the intermediate
standard of Craig and Nguyen. In both cases, the Court laid out why
there was a middle level of scrutiny and why it was necessary to create
a new level of scrutiny for gender. Gender discrimination is not as
deeply rooted in history and as biological as race and national origin.
It also is distinguishable from age and wealth. Gender classifications
are distinctive and should be treated as such. Intermediate scrutiny
should be maintained, as it allows for governments to institute gender
laws that may distinguish or exclude in some way but classify in the
direct pursuit of gender parity.
Truly, gender does not fit into a strict scrutiny standard of review
like race or national origin and gender certainly does not require the
kind of exacting judicial examination required by a heightened level
of scrutiny. It also should not fall within the most deferential rational
basis review, which currently is more of a rational basis plus standard
of review. Laws have been rarely declared unconstitutional under a
rational basis review. Although it is unknown how the California
courts will rule on the law mandating women on corporate boards, the
Court does need to address which standard of review it will apply to
gender for the lower courts to follow and apply in the upcoming years.
This perception and differing views of intermediate scrutiny,
however, do not need to be addressed in a lawsuit regarding the
constitutionality of California’s SB 826. SB 826 and corporate gender
quotas are simply constitutional under Califano. Califano is directly
applicable to female quotas, as SB 826 creates economic disparity to
remedy years of gender discrimination and inequality.184 Califano
may have been decided in 1977, but it is still good law today and
directly applicable to a quota that impacts economical and financial
differences in the corporate environment.
VI. CONCLUSION
SB 826 is a bold but necessary step California took to fight back
against years of systematic gender discrimination. Yet, the reality is
184. See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 314 (1977).
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that female quotas, in any realm, but especially in a corporate
workplace, are not accepted. There is a very vocal opposition. Some
claim that it destroys the ideas of merit, effort, and hard work.
Lawsuits claim these female-focused programs and legislative actions
are discriminatory towards men and reinforce stereotypes about
women. Contrary to what these lawsuits say, however, these femaleonly programs are not anti-male and aim to defy overbroad
generalizations instead of adhering to them. These programs and laws
mandating women on corporate boards attempt to bring change and,
even with such drastic measures, it will take forty to fifty years for
gender equality to be a reality.
SB 826 is an experimental measure in California and in the United
States. There is no precedent, but the courts are likely to address the
issue of female quotas soon. Indeed, this Note discussed why
corporate quotas mandating women in corporate board positions are
constitutional and do not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Although it is unknown how the California courts will rule on the
lawsuits opposing SB 826, Califano provides a straightforward
answer. Statutes, like SB 826, deliberately made to directly
compensate women for past economic discrimination may be
discriminatory, but they are constitutional. There is a long and
continuous history of discrimination against women, and a quota is a
remedy.
SB 826, and any female quotas that other states may implement,
may seem abrupt, but change sometimes needs to be forced. Here,
remedying years and years of discrimination towards women requires
a mandated advantage. Ultimately, the hope is that these new genderbased classifications setting forth female-focused initiatives will be
useful in breaking down the “glass ceilings” and “78 cents wage gaps.”
As these phrases become “outdated,” so should actual discrimination
and the concepts these phrases describe.
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